CXI: PRINCIPLES ON PERSONAL STATUS AND CAPACITY

1. DEFINITION
Personal status: general term
-includes both condition and capacity
-embraces:
• Beginning and end of human personality
• Capacity to have rights in general
• Capacity to engage in legal transactions
• Protection of personal interests
• Family relations:
• Husband and wife
• Parent and child
• Guardian and ward
• Transactions of family law:
• Marriage
• Divorce
• Separation
• Adoption
• Legitimation
• emancipation
• Succession
-taken from ROMAN DOCTRINE OF
Status libertates: freedom
Status Civitates: citizenship
Status familiae: position as head of the house/ free person subject to the pater familia
Capacity (in accordance w/ A37, NCC):

JURIDICAL CAPACITY	CAPACITY TO ACT
fitness to be subject of legal relations (PASSIVE)	Power to do acts with legal effects (ACTIVE)
Inherent in every natural person	acquired
Lost only through death	May be lost

ART 15, NCC: NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE - PERSONAL LAW determines
Art. 15.  Laws relating to
*family rights and duties,
*or to the status,
*condition and
*legal capacity of persons
>National law - RP Law - applies to Filipinos wherever they are
>ALIENS: depends on WON they are citizens of states that follow domicile law or national law (depend upon personal law)
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RECTO V. HARDEN (1959)
Short summary: Recto was hired by American wife to represent her in RP case for protection of her interest in the conjugal property, vs. American husband, in conjunction with the divorce proceeding she's going to file in US. They won in TC, but on appeal, American H & W agreed to settle. Recto now wants to collect fees for services, but as defense, Harden spouses argues that the contract's object was unlawful (Divorce not allowed in RP) so it is invalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it against them. Court ruled for Recto
Facts:
Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M. Recto, for suit
…to secure an increase in the amount of support she was receinging
…to preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugal partnership
…in contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to file in the US.
Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share of conjugal partnership after liquidation
TC: for Mrs. Harden
CA: Harden Sps. Mutually released and forever discharged each other from all actions, debts, duties, and claims to the conjugal partnership
-Recto filed motion contesting agreement
-defense: contract of services invalid: to secure a divorce decree in violation of our laws
WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT? YES
*CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLIC ORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICY
1. The contract has a lawful object: it is to protect the interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership during the pendency of a divorce suit
-NOT
…to secure divorce
…to facilitate or promote procurement of divorce
2. Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they being nationals of country whose laws allow divorce (following the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the marriage)
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1. LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION V. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
*status, once established by the personal law of the party, is given universal recognition. (UNIVERSALITY OF STATUS)
-once status is set by Country A, Country B is bound to attribute to a person of Country A the status that is established in Country A
-Courts of Country B also cannot introduce exceptions or qualifications that are not set in Country A
If ALIENS sue and are sued in RP Courts
*RP would apply RP Procedural rules relevant to status and capacity (JUDICIAL JURISDICTION)
BUT would apply personal law of the alien to determine status and capacity (LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION)
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BARNUEVO V. FUSTER (1913)
Short summary: Spanish subjects get married in Spain, but wanted to divorce in RP. Wife further claims the refund of the 30k Spanish dollars which is allegedly her paraphernal property. Court held that even if divorce is not allowed in RP, the court could still exercise jurisdiction over the parties who are domiciled in RP and it is not divested jurisdiction by the subject matter.
Facts:
Gabriel FUSTER and Constanza Yanez were
>married in Spain 1875
>1899: made an agreement in public document that they resolved to separate and live apart
>1909: Constanza commenced DIVORCE proceedings vs. Gabriel for Adultery, praying for:
• Decree of divorce
• Conjugal society liquidated
• Share adjudicated to her
• Payment of support
(probably the property of the spouses belonging to the conjugal property are all located in RP)
TC: for CONSTANZA
• suspension of life in common between plaintiff and defendant
• Payment of support
• Division of communal property
>>>BOTH Parties appealed: Alleged dowry: WON it should be returned to CONSTANZA
WON RP courts are competent to decree the divorce? YES
1. Authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is NOT COMPRISED W/n the personal status of the husband and wife
-whole theory of the statutes and the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law
-authority and jurisdiction of courts are matters of public or political law
-jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to PROCEDURE are considered to be of a public nature, submitted to the TERRITORIAL PRINCIPLE
2. All persons have to demand justice in a court which would have coercive means to enforce any decision they may render
3. Justice should be administered WITHOUT TAKING INTO ANY ACCOUNT THE STATE TO WHICH THE LITIGANTS BELONG
-all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their people, but to those foreigners who contract w/n the country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner affect their sovereignty
4. HERE
5. CFI had jurisdiction over the person of the litigants: residents of Manila, had domicile in Manila
6. THEREFORE: CFI had power and jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. Not divested of jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation
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If this case be decided now in RP: no absolute divorce: Divorce is considered violation of public policy. Therefore: courts could no longer try actions for divorce even if brought by nationals whose laws allow it
3. BEGINNING AND END OF PERSONALITY
BEGINNING: depends on personal law
• GERMAN CIVIL CODE: completion of person's birth
• SPANISH CIVIL CODE: after person be alive for at least 24 hours
• PHILIPPINE CIVIL CODE: Birth determines personality
• If born normal (9 months): if born alive at time completely delivered from mother's womb (even if dies later after a few hours)
• If w/ intra-uterine life of 7 months: alive at least 24 hours after complete delivery from maternal womb
• If fetus: considered a person for all purposes favorable to it, provided it be born later (depends on the intra-uterine life - see above)
ART 40: Birth determines personality; But the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
ART 41: For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies w/n 24 hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
TOLENTINO: before birth, the fetus is not a person but merely a part of the internal organ of the mother.
-because of the expectancy that it may be born, the law protects it and reserves its rights, making its legal existence, if it should be born alive, retroact to the moment of its conception
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GELUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
Short facts: Nita Villanueva had 3 abortions done by the same doctor, Antonio Geluz. Husband Oscar Lazo sued Geluz on the 3rd abortion seeking damages. CA sustained claim of Lazo for P3,000.
Ratio:
*WHY NO DAMAGES that would accrue to the parents DUE TO INJURY OR DEATH OF UNBORN CHILD:
-no personal injury or damages to an unborn child: COA extinguished by the prenatal death of the child
-no transmission (parents claim damages because of the injuries their unborn child incurred) because one that lacked juridical personality (juridical capacity) cannot transmit rights
-Art40, NCC not applicable: the conceived child could only be considered born (thus, with personality), if, in accordance w/ Art41, it be subsequently born alive. Here, CHILD WAS DEAD WHEN SEPARATED FROM ITS MOTHER'S WOMB
*BUT PARENTS MAY CLAIM DAMAGES FOR INJURY DIRECTLY INFLICTED UPON THEM:
-no actual damages: can't expect either help, support or services from an unborn child
-moral damages: for illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the fetus (distress and anguish attendant to the loss of the fetus, disappointment of parental expectations)
-exemplary damages
BUT HERE: However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.
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EXTINGUISHMENT: upon death
-declaration of death issued by a competent court is considered valid for all purposes
-effect of death: some of the rights and obligations may be extinguished, some may be passed on to the successors
LIMJOCO V. INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRAGRANTE (1948)
Short summary: Pedro Fragrante had a pending application for CPC when he died. His intestate estate now wants to have the CPC issued in its favor. Court considered the estate a person (juridical/artificial) which could apply for a CPC and be issued such
Facts
-stated above: Pedro Fragrante died while pending his application for CPC.
WON THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED PERSON MAY BE CONSIDERED A PERSON TO WHICH THE CPC MAY BE ISSUED? YES
WHY DEEM ESTATE A "PERSON":
-avoid the injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged
-BILLINGS V. STATE: to enable a disposition of assets to be properly made
-Consti: cannot interpret "persons" in consti on EPC and DPC to just cover natural persons or else would be deprived of property w/o due process, would not be immune from unreasonable searches and seizures
\ ESTATE should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of settlement and distribution of his estate, which include the judicial administration of rights and fulfillment of obligations of Fragrante which survived after his death, one of which is his pending application with Public Service Commission for CPC
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4. ABSENCE
-no uniform treatment
-steps to deal w/ absence:
1. There's a rebuttable presumption that a person is dead when he has been absent for a number of years
2. A person's unexplained absence is judicially investigated and established which results in legal effects similar to those of death
3. A judicial decree shall have to be issued declaring the person dead before legal effects of death take place
Civil Code Presumptions:
ART 390. After the absence of 7 years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of 10 years. If he disappeared after the age of 75 years, an absence of 5 years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
ART 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for 4 years since the loss of the vessel or airplane
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for 4 years
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known, for 4 years
Family Code Presumptions (for purposes of Marriage):
ART41. reduced the 7 years to 4 years, then the 4 years for special circumstances to 2 years
-but the spouse present must first institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse w/o w/c the subsequent marriage is void ab initio
Summary of periods
GR: 7 years (for all other purposes)
X:
1. Succession
GR: 10 years
X: if lost when above 75 y.o.: 5 years
2. Special circumstances: 4 years:
1. On board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, not been heard of
2. On board a plane which is missing, not been heard of
3. Was in the armed forces and has taken part in war, missing
4. Has been in danger of death under other circumstances, existence not been known
3. For purposes of contracting a subsequent marriage
GR: 4 years
X: 2 years
WHY Shorter period? More modern means of communications
What are determined by personal law:
*legal effects of absence
*restrictions on the absentee's capacity to act
5. NAME
B4: not a problem because persons are free to assume a name and change it at will
NOW: determined by law, cannot be changed w/o judicial intervention
ART 364-366, NCC: rules that govern the use of surnames of legitimate, illegitimate, legitimated and adopted children; married women; separated and widowed women
-make distinctions between the right of women whose marriage has been annulled to use her former husband's name depending on WON she gave cause for the annulment of the marriage.
ART 376, NCC: no person can change his name or surname w/o judicial authority
Some of the grounds alleged when the courts have allowed petitions:
1. Ridiculous or tainted w/ dishonor or extremely difficult to pronounce
2. Change is necessary to avoid confusion
3. The right to a new name is a consequence of a change in status
4. Sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality w/c unduly hamper social and business life
PADILLA V. REPUBLIC (1982)
-one's name is a reflection of one's paternity, inevitably affect status of a child as legitimate or illegitimate
-probably denied the petition for change of name if it would leave to confusion as regards one's paternity
Change of name: personal law determines WON he could validly change name
6. AGE OF MAJORITY
-determined by one's personal law
-effects of emancipation:
• Parental authority ceases
• Now qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life
Exceptions: A46, PD 603
-RA 6809: age of majority lowered to 18 from 21 BUT parental consent still needed for marriages of couples below 21
7. CAPACITY (TO ACT)
GR: governed by personal law because it is in the best position to decide what RESTRICTIONS may be imposed on the individual
-restrictions determine legal position of the person
*INCAPACITIES ATTACHED TO THE LEGAL STATUS OF AN INDIVIDUAL GO W/ HIM WHEREVER HE IS (because it depends on his personal law)
• But all persons must first ascertain the legal capacity of the other party before contracting with him (but this is nearly impossible)
X:
1. TORT: law of the place of the tort
2. MARRIED WOMEN: some jurisdictions subject restrictions on the capacity of married women to contract - does not follow personal law of the wife but the law which govern the marital relations of the spouses
3. A person may be capacitated to act in accordance with his personal law but the place where the contract is to be performed does not consider him capable of contracting
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INSULAR GOVERNMENT V FRANK (1909)
Short summary: RP entered into contract w/ Frank when he was around 18-22 years old, which, if he breaches, would make him liable for refund of his airfare and 1/2 salary that is to be given to him upon arrival in RP. He breached it so RP sues him but he raises the defense that he is considered a minor in RP so he cannot be compelled to follow contract here. Court ruled otherwise, using lex loci contractus
Facts:
-RP entered into a contract for 2 years with George Frank for him to be a stenographer
-contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, where he was already considered an adult w/ full authority to contract
-Frank would be paid $1200 per year
-he would be given in advance:
• Travelling expenses from Chicago to Manila
• 1/2 salary
-in case he breached the contract, he would refund RP of the advances mentioned
-Frank breached the contract, so RP sued for collection of refund
-defense: he was a minor at the time the contract was entered into, not responsible under RP law
TC: for RP
WON FRANK COULD BE COMPELLED TO PERFORM OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACT WHEN HE IS CONSIDERED A MINOR IN RP? YES

RP	Illinois
Age of majority: 23	Age of majority: below 23

-Matters bearing upon the
• Execution
• Interpretation
• Validity
…of the contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made
-Matters bearing upon the PERFORMANCE: law of the place of performance
-Matters respecting a REMEDY: depend on the law of the place where the suit is brought
CONCLUSIONS:
1. Amendments in no way affected the terms of the contract in question
2. Since Frank is qualified at the place and time of contracting, he can't interpose a defense that he is not capacitated in accordance with the law of the place of execution
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If Frank's Capacity to act is made basis in deciding this case, thus the courts would refer to his personal law - the law of Illinois - the case would be decided the same way because in accordance with the law of Illinois, he is capacitated to contract