Digest for September 1, 2009
CSC vs. Lucas
January 21, 1999, Pardo
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts
-Raquel Linatok filed w/ office of Secretary, DA, an affidavit-complaint vs. Lucas (photographer of DA) for misconduct, allegedly because Mr. Lucas touched her thighs down her ankle and when she kicked him for repeating the same actions, the two had a verbal exchanged and Mr. Lucas shoved her to the door twice, causing her to stumble.
-When Lucas was summoned by BOPI to answer the complaint, Lucas said that there was no malice when he accidentally touched Linatok’s leg when he reached for his shoes.
*BOPI: GUILTY for SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and recommended to be suspended for 1m,1d. Approved by Sec of DA. Lucas appealed to CSC.
*CSC: GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT, dismissed from service. MR denied. appeal with CA.
*CA: set aside CSC resolution, reinstate BOPI resolution (simple misconduct)
-based on MC 49-89, classification of administrative offenses:
a. grave misconduct: grave offenses, punishable by dismissal
b. simple misconduct: less grave offenses, punishable by suspension (1st offense), dismissal (2nd offense)
+ no Due Notice: only found out about the modification of the charge against him when he received notice of the resolution dismissing him from office (wait, the charge was modified?)
ISSUES:
(a) whether respondent Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct
(b) whether the act complained of constitutes grave misconduct.
Held
(a) YES
-as Lucas was merely charged with simple misconduct but was convicted of grave misconduct, he was deprived of his right to due process.
*Due Process: informed of the charges against him + convicted of ONLY the crime w/ w/c he was charged
(b) No proof
“Of course, we do not in any way condone respondent’s act. Even in jest, he had no right to touch complainant’s leg. However, under the circumstances, such act is not constitutive of grave misconduct, in the absence of proof that respondent was maliciously motivated. We note that respondent has been in the service for twenty (20) years and this is his first offense.”
Disposition: DENY PETITION BY CSC
BERNARDO VS. CA
May 27, 2004, CALLEJOR
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
-Bernardo was a Claims Adjuster of Land Bank, then became the Loans and Discound Division Head, then at the time when the complaint was filed against him, he was just promoted as Asst. Branch Manager.
-He maintains an account with the bank. On January 1986, he made a deposit, photocopied his bank passbook with the deposit shown, and then withdrew the same amount. He also executed as treasurer-in-trust of Markay Trading Manpower Services (MTMSI) a Treasurer’s Affidavit and a letter-of-authority to SEC. MTMSI’s Articles of Incorporation was later registered with SEC. Bernardo was later elected as treasurer of MTMSI. HOWEVER, he never opened an account with LBP for MTMSI.
-LBP filed FORMAL CHARGE for GROSS NEGLECT, GRAVE MISCONDUCT, CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE BANK, AND SERIOUS VIOLATION OF CSC RULES & REGULATIONS, as shown by the ff acts (rephrased):
1. engaging in private business w/o permission and authority as required by CS RR.
2. executing under oath in an official document “Treasuer’s Affidavit” wherein Bernardo attested to have been elected the treasurer of MTMSI and depositing in his account the sum P500k when he fully knew that such statements were false
-During investigation, Bernardo claimed that he did not participate in MTMSI (and showed evidence such as his testimony and affidavits of incorporators of MTMSI) and so, he did not engage in business. Hearing Officer though presented checkbooks of MTMSI which were signed by Bernardo.
*HEARING OFFICER: GUILTY for engaging in business, occupation or vocation w/o permission + acts of falsification = Grave Misconduct in Office
--considered 2 pending administrative case + use of LB facilities + taking advantage of his official position in perpetrating offense [aggravating] - 19 years govt service [mitigating]
--since guilty in both counts, penalty imposed should be that corresponding to the most grave = GRAVE MISCONDUCT
---recommended Gravest penalty
*LBP: approved recommendation. Bernardo appealed
*MSPB: affirm LBP resolution, but modified it (found Bernardo guilty of misrepresentation = dishonesty for engaging in private business w/o permit); Bernardo DISMISSED. MRs dismissed. Appealed to CSC
*CSC: affirm penalty. Bernardo guilty of grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and engaging in private business w/o prior authority from the head of office.
--on GRAVE MISCONDUCT & CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO BEST INTEREST OF SERVICE CHARGE: on the fact that Bernardo deposited the alleged paid up capital of the corporation then withdrew it on the same date, which should (?) not be done prior to issuance of SEC Registration and w/o Resolution of the Board of Directors
--Bernardo absolved of dishonesty charge
--Bernardo MR mainly because CSC’s resolution was not the ground used to charge him…DENIED
-Bernardo filed petition for certiorari before SC. Remanded to CA.
*CA: DENIED
Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in affirming the resolution of the CSC that he violated Section 36(b)(24) of P.D. No. 807, implemented in Section 14, Rule XVIII of the CSC Rules and Regulations;
2. WON the petitioner was deprived of his right to due process when the CA affirmed the resolution of the CSC finding him administratively guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service based on acts not covered by the formal charges lodged against him.
1. NO
Even if Bernardo alleged that he resigned from MTMSI even before the corporation started business operations, there is evidence that shows he was not only an incorporator, he was also the treasurer (BOARD MEMBER) of MTMSI. He was even signatory to several checks in favor of the corporation from 1986 to 1987. He also admitted that before he engaged in business, he failed to secure permission of the employer.
2. YES
- CSC did err in finding him administratively liable for depositing P500k and w/drawing it on the same day as it was not alleged in the charges against him.
BUT
-BERNARDO IS GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
…he admitted to depositing the amount to his account then withdrawing it = MISREPRESENTATION
Misrepresentation: a false statement about material fact in any contract or other transaction that misleads the party to whom it is made.
Dishonesty: the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact. It signifies absence of integrity, a disposition to betray, cheat deceive or defraud, bad faith (Arca vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, CA-G.R. No. 17679-R, November 24, 1958.)
WON there’s falsification of OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS: must have acted in his capacity as an employee or official of the LBP and must have altered the genuine document or execute the false document relevant to or in connection with the performance of his duty as such.
>>> Bernardo acted in his capacity as Treasurer of MTMSI, hence, the Board finds him guilty of Misrepresentation amounting to Dishonesty. In misrepresentation of a material fact, he made it appear that his personal account in LBP belongs to the MTMSI placed in his name as Treasurer-in-Trust, for purposes of issuance of certificate of incorporation, by the SEC and by concealing the truth he committed dishonesty or deceit and put the integrity of the Bank in jeopardy to the prejudice of the banking operation and to the damage of the creditors, if any, of the corporation.
WON acts imputed should be connected with performance of his duty: causes which warrant the dismissal of a civil servant need not necessarily be work-related or committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged [Qualified in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission: should be re: charges of DISHONESTY, OPPRESSION OR GRAVE MISCONDUCT]
DISPOSITION: DENY
CSC vs. BELAGAN
October 19, 2004, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Nature: petition for review on certiorari of CA deci
When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose,[1] or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.[2] This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still change or reform himself.
FACTS:
-2 separate complaints for sexual harassment and various malfeasances were filed against Dr. Belagan, the Superintendent of DECS.
1st (MAGDALENA’s): She was applying for a permit to operate a pre-school and during the inspection of the pre-school, Belagan placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheeks. Magdalena kept mum about the incident but when she followed up her application, Belagan replied, “Mag-date muna tayo.” She only told her husband about the incident when he asked for the status of their application. Belagan forwarded their application, with a recommendation for the approval of the pre-school. When Magdalena found out that some DECS employees were suing Belagan, she decided to complain to DECS secretary Gloria. Belagan was placed under suspension.
2nd (LIGAYA ANNAWI): She alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions, respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back. Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers’ salaries; (2) failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing to release the teachers’ uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity pay; and (4) failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and regulations.
DECS joint investigation: Belagan denied sexual harassment accusations. Presented evidence against admin acts.
*DECS Sec: GUILTY of 4 counts of sexual “indignities or harassments” committed against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of “sexual advances or indignities” against Magdalena; DISMISSED from service. Absolved of admin malfeasance and dereliction of duty. Appealed to CSC
*CSC: affirm DECS Sec BUT dismissed complaint of Ligaya. Transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct. MR (raised that he has never been charged of any offense in his 37 years of service while Magdalena was charged with 22 offenses before MTC Baguio and 23 complaints before brgy captains of Brgy Silang and Hillside in Baguio. (in general, these charges concern grave threats or slander) STILL DENIED. Appealed before CA.
*CA: dismissed Magdalena’s complaint, reversed CSC Resolutions.
Why? Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable. “Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, “she is not one whom any male would attempt to steal a kiss.”
ISSUE
WON complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible
HELD
Preliminary matters:
GR: Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. This Court is, after all, not a trier of facts.
X: when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court or a quasi-judicial body, like petitioner herein.
Rules on character evidence (R130.51.a.3): the provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to administrative offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin cases, only character evidence that would establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged may be proved. Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.
>>>IN THIS CASE: no evidence bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What were presented were charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her.
Rules of evidence for establishing lack of credibility of the witness: Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It refers to a person’s integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. A witness may be discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity.
“SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party’s witness. –A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.”
>>>Magdalena testified so she’s considered a witness. Her character/reputation is a proper subject of inquiry. HOWEVER
(1) the charges and complaints happened way back in the 70s and 80s while the act complained of happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalena’s character or reputation.
*evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.
“It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable to change or reform.” –ooooh…quotable quote!
(2) no evidence of conviction of the offenses charged.
The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility. This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct. Significantly, the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts. As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the charges against her listed by respondent.
(3) CSC resolution was supported by substantial evidence. Magdalena’s testimony was given weight by CSC plus corroborated by affidavit of Ngabit re: complaint by Magdalena.
ON ALLEGED MOTIVE (TO PRESSURE BELAGAN TO ISSUE PERMIT): none. Permit was already issued when complaint was filed.
ON Penalty:
*Misconduct: intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
>grave misconduct: the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest.
>>Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
>>> This is apparently present in respondent’s case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand for a “date,” an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school. Respondent’s act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.
***SC Considered length of service (37 years) + analogous cases: suspension for 1 year w/o pay
Disposition: Granted. Affirm CSC resolution. Suspend Belagan.
VILLANUEVA V. CA
July 20, 2006, Tinga, J
NATURE: Petition for Review
FACTS
-Villanueva (Legislative Assistant II of the Cashiering and Administrative Records Division, HR) and Elizabeth Navarro-Argueles (confidential assistant and DAUGHTER of Rep Navarro), both married, were seen naked and lying on the couch by two roving security officers. Complaint for Grave Misconduct, Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service were charged against Villanueva. No charge filed against Navarro-Arguelles, as no jurisdiction over confidential assistants.
*House Disciplinary Board: GUILTY, SUSPENDED FOR 1 YEAR W/O PAY w/ stern warning that any infracture in the future will be dealt more severely. MR. Increased penalty to DISMISSAL w/ forfeiture of all benefits.
*Speaker Villar: affirm decision. MR denied. Appeal to CSC
*CSC: modified penalty to suspension. MR by house and Villanueva: both denied. HR filed petition for certiorari, GAD, with CA
*CA: granted petition for certiorari, sustained HDB Deci: adhered to Dicdican vs. Fernan case where Court dismissed court personnel guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct.
>>offense relates to his official functions: By virtue of his position, Villanueva had free rein inside the building even after office hours.
>>>MR DENIED.
HELD: FOR VILLANUEVA
1. Remedy of HR to appeal already prescribed. Should have filed petition for review, not petition for certiorari.
2. Villanueva’s offense ≠ grave misconduct
Amosco vs. Magro: Misconduct in office: it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual
…. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office.
… intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.
…In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
>>>IN THIS CASE: OFFENSE NOT CONNECTED WITH PERFORMANCE OF HIS FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES. Separate character of the man from the character fo the officer.
3. But GUILTY OF DISGRACEFUL AND IMMORAL CONDUCT. penalty (1st time offender): suspension. So CSC Correct, no GAD.
4. Dicdican not controlling: that case involved a court personnel which is under the disciplinary administration of the court. BUT in this case, we are not acting as a personnel administrator but rather as the adjudicative appellate tribunal of last resort reviewing the decisions of lower courts. It is our responsibility to confirm whether the lower courts upheld the law. The law in this case clearly states that the proper penalty is suspension and not dismissal as held by the appellate court, hence, suspension it must be.
Disposition: Granted.
Bacsin vs. Wahiman
April 30, 2008
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS
-Bacsin, a public elementary school teacher, was charged with Misconduct for fondling the breast of his student, as was witnessed by another student. In his defense, Bacsin claimed that the touching happened by accident.
*CSC: GUILTY of Grave Misconduct (Acts of Sexual Harassment), DISMISSED. Act contained in the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. MR Denied. Appealed to CA
*CA: Affirm. Even if Bacsin was formally charged with “disgraceful and immoral conduct and misconduct”, CSC found that the allegations and evidence sufficiently proved petitioner’s guilt of grave misconduct, which is punishable by dismissal from service.
ISSUE: WON MISCONDUCT (which was the charge against him) includes Grave Misconduct, thus, he can be convicted of such even if that was not charged
HELD: YES
*Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission: The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.
>>>It is clear that petitioner was sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him, which was his act of improperly touching one of his students. Thus informed, he defended himself from such charge. The failure to designate the offense specifically and with precision is of no moment in this administrative case.
>>>Charges against him imputes acts covered and penalized under Anti-sexual harassment act of 1995
*Domingo v. Rayala: it is not necessary that the demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.
>>>act of mashing the breast, in an education environment, upon a student, who felt fear at the time Bacsin touched her, are sufficient grounds for grave misconduct
*there is grave misconduct! The act of petitioner of fondling one of his students is against a law, RA 7877, and is doubtless inexcusable. The particular act of petitioner cannot in any way be construed as a case of simple misconduct. Sexually molesting a child is, by any norm, a revolting act that it cannot but be categorized as a grave offense. Parents entrust the care and molding of their children to teachers, and expect them to be their guardians while in school. Petitioner has violated that trust. The charge of grave misconduct proven against petitioner demonstrates his unfitness to remain as a teacher and continue to discharge the functions of his office.
*no denial of due process: The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. These elements are present in this case, where petitioner was properly informed of the charge and had a chance to refute it, but failed.
…A teacher who perverts his position by sexually harassing a student should not be allowed, under any circumstance, to practice this noble profession. So it must be here.
Disposition: DISMISS Petition
Laurel vs. CSC
October 28, 1991, DAVIDE
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari?
FACTS
-Laurel, as Governor of Batangas, appointed his Brother as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, but later designated his brother as ACTING Provincial Administrator, valid unless designation earlier revoked. Brother later promoted to Civil Security Officer.
-Sanggalang (complainant) wrote to CSC re: “appointment” of Benjamin Laurel (brother of Gov. Laurel) for alleged nepotism. Gov. Laurel replied that there is no nepotism because the positions to which brother was appointed were primarily confidential in nature. As to position of Provincial Administrator, brother was merely DESIGNATED as Acting Provincial Administrator, and NOT APPOINTED.
Also alleged that there was no violation f Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because Benjamin is entitled to a monthly representation.
*CSC: revoked designation of Benjamin as Acting Provincial Administrator for being nepotic
>>>"the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."
>>>Provincial Administrator belongs to a position which requires competitive service, so Benjamin cannt be appointed to the said position, he being a non-career officer.
-MR DENIED. Position not primarily confidential in nature: neither belongs to the personal staff nor are the duties confidential in nature
ISSUES
1. Is the position of Provincial Administrator primarily confidential?
2. Does the rule on nepotism apply to designation?
3. May a private citizen who does not claim any better right to a position file a verified complaint with the Civil Service Commission to denounce a violation by an appointing authority of the Civil Service Law and rules?
HELD
1. NO.
(note that Gov. Laurel did not raise this as his defense, he even recognized that the said position is not primarily confidential)
-Provincial Administrator is w/n Career Service under PD 807
-nature of the position test.
-as it is a career position, Gov. Laurel cannot appoint someone from the non-career service to the said position.
2. YES
-considered nepotism: Related w/n 3rd degree of consanguinity, not among the exeptions
-"By legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."
-provision on nepotism does not differentiate between designation and appointment
-if a designation is not to be deemed included in the term appointment under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807, then the prohibition on nepotism would be meaningless and toothless. Any appointing authority may circumvent it by merely designating, and not appointing, a relative within the prohibited degree to a vacant position in the career service. Indeed, as correctly stated by public respondent, "what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly."
3. YES.
-Any citizen of the Philippines may bring that matter to the attention of the Civil Service Commission for appropriate action conformably with its role as the central personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws and rules governing the selection, utilization, training and discipline of civil servants, with the power and function to administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system. Moreover, Section 37 of the decree expressly allows a private citizen to directly file with the Civil Service Commission a complaint against a government official or employee, in which case it may hear and decide the case or may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct an investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken. This provision gives teeth to he constitutional exhortation that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be, inter alia, accountable to the people. An ordinary citizen who brings to the attention of the appropriate office any act or conduct of a government official or employee which betrays the public interest deserves nothing less than the praises, support and encouragement of society. The vigilance of the citizenry is vital in a democracy.
Disposition. DENIED.
Sangguniang Brgy of Brgy Don Mariano Marcos vs. Martinez
March 3, 2008, CHICO-NAZARIO
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS
-Martinez, incumbent Punong Barangay, was administratively charged w/ Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by Sangguniang Brgy (SB) through verified complaint. SB filed w/ S Bayan an amended admin complaint against Martinez for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for the ff:
1. Failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the income of their solid waste management project since 2001 particularly the sale of fertilizer derived from composting.
2. Failure to submit/remit to the barangay treasurer the sale of recyclable materials taken from garbage collection.
3. Using the garbage truck for other purposes like hauling sand and gravel for private persons without monetary benefit to the barangay because no income from this source appears in the year end report even if payments were collected x x x.
4. Using/spending barangay funds for repair, gasoline, lubricants, wheels and other spare parts of the garbage truck instead of using the money or income of said truck from the garbage fees collected as income from its Sold Waste Management Project. x x x.
5. Unliquidated traveling expenses for Seminar/Lakbay-Aral in 2003 because although a cash advance was made by the respondent for the said purpose, he, however, did not attend said seminar because on the dates when he was supposed to be on seminar they saw him in the barangay. x x x.
6. That several attempts to discuss said problem during sessions were all in vain because respondent declined to discuss it and would adjourn the session.x x x.6
-Martinez failed to Answer so he was declared in default. He was also placed in preventive suspension for 60 days pending investigation.
*S. Bayan: Removal from office. Decision conveyed to Mayor. Mayor issued Memo stating that S. Bayan is not empowered to order the removal. But since did not reverse findings, suspended indefinitely. Martinez filed petition for Certiorari GAD + TRO/PI before TC
*TC: SBayan & Memo of Mayor VOID. Proper courts are empowered to remove an elective local official from office (Section 60, LGC). MR. Denied.
ISSUE
WON SBayan may remove an elective local official from office
HELD
(note: Martinez term already expired but since it is capable of repetition yet evading review, court would still take cognizance of the case)
DISCUSSION ON SECTION 60: Legislative intent was to confer upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials.
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.—An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
x x x x.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. (Emphasis provided.)
> Salalima v. Guingona, Jr: the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code.
Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991:
Article 125. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. x x x.
x x x x.
(b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.
The Court nullified the aforequoted rule since the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its authority when it granted to the "disciplining authority" the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is clear that under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the power to remove Martinez.
ON ARGUMENT THAT SANGGUNIAN CONCERNED COULD HEAR AND DECIDE ADMIN CASES INVOLVING ELECTIVE BRGY OFFICIALS: Pablico v. Villapando: It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (sic 125)20 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as a check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the disciplining authority. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to decide whether or not a local chief executive may be removed from office, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from the capriciousness or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Thus, the petitioner’s interpretation would defeat the clear intent of the law.
*SEC 61, LGC: provides procedure for filing an administrative case vs. erring elective BRGY official before S Panlungsod or S Bayan BUT THE TWO CANNOT ORDER REMOVAL! COURTS ARE EXCLUSIVELY VESTED W/ SUCH POWER.
*ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES ARGUMENT: GR: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.
X: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
5) where the question raised is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
6) where judicial intervention is urgent;
7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
8) where the controverted acts violate due process;
9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
11) when strong public interest is involved; and
12) in quo warranto proceedings
>>> IN THIS CASE: act of removing Martinez from office when S Bayan had no power to do so is an act patently illegal, therefore, no need to exhaust admin remedies.
Disposition. DENY petition. Affirm RTC.
do you have a digest of the case entitled Leonardo Arca vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, November 1958. tnx -
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