Sunday, November 22, 2009

Specpro Notes for November 21

II. Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons
A. Venue and Process – Rule 73, Sections 1-4
Section 1 – Where estate of deceased persons settled.
If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
Whether a citizen or an alien
His will shall be proved,
Or letters of administration granted
And his estate settled,
In the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death
And if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
The Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent
Shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court
So far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent
Or of the location of his estate
Shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding
Except in an appeal from that court
In the original sense
Or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
 
Section 2 – Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage
When the marriage is dissolved
By death of the husband or wife
The community property shall be
…Inventoried
…Administered
…And liquidated
…And the debts thereof paid
In the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse
If both spouses have died,
the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated
in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
 
Section 3 – Process
In the exercise of probate jurisdiction,
Courts of First Instance may issue warrants and process
Necessary to compel the attendance of witnesses
Or to carry into effect their orders and judgments
And all other powers granted to them by law.
If a person does not perform an
order
or judgment
rendered by a court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction
it may issue a warrant for the apprehension
and imprisonment of such person
until he performs such order or judgment
or is released.
 
Section 4. Presumption of death
For purposes of settlement of his estate,
A person shall be presumed dead
If absent and unheard from for the periods fixed in the Civil Code
But if such person proves to be alive,
He shall be entitled to the balance o his estate
After payment of all his debts.
The balance may be recovered by motion in the same proceeding.
 
Civil Code Provisions relevant:
Article 390: 10yr-absence for purposes of opening succession
If 75 years: absence of 5 years
Article 391: danger of death: 4 years
a. On board a vessel lost during a sea voyage
b. On board a plane which is missing
c. Was in the armed forces and has taken part in war
d. Has been in danger of death under other circumstances
 
Article 392: recovery of property upon reappearance
If the absentee appears
Or without appearing his existence is proved
He shall recover his property in the condition in which it may be found
And the price of any property that may have been alienated
Or the property acquired therewith;
But he cannot claim either fruits or rents
 
Regalado: Article 392 + Rule 73.4: conditions of recovery of absentee
(a) All debts must have been paid
(b) He shall recover his property in the condition in which it may have been found, together with the price of any property that may have been alienated or the property acquired therewith
(c) He is not entitled to fruits or rents
 
San Juan v. Cruz, 479 SCRA 410
Short SUmmary: This is the case wherein a devisee of a deceased pending petition for probate died, and his heirs were presented to substitute him, But one of the heirs of the decedent opposed said substitution, insisting that a court-appointed administrator or executor should instead be the proper substitute
 
Decedent: Loreto Samia San Juan
Last will and testament: Oscar Casa as one of the devisees
Death: October 25, 1988
-Atty. Teodorico Aquino filed PETITION FOR PROBATE with QC RTC
-pending petition, Oscar died intestate on May 24, 1999: so Firs of Aquino et al. entered their appearances as counsel for Federico Casa, Jr. (one of Oscar's heirs) - entry of appearance DENIED: Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee
-RTC ordered Aquino to secure appointment of administrator or executor of estate of Oscar Casa
-Aquino filed pleading "Appointment of Administrator" signed by alleged heirs of Oscar Casa, praying that Federico Casa Jr. be designated as administrator of Oscar Casa's estate and that he may be substituted (Federico is the nearest accessible heir to attend the hearing of the probate of the will + most competent to assume the responsibilities and duties of the ADMINISTRATOR)
-Epifanio San Juan filed MOTION TO DECLARE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR AS INADEQUATE OR INSUFFICIENT: heirs should present an administrator of Oscar Casa's estate as representative
>reply: (1) R3.16: heirs of Oscar may be substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate
(2) Court enjoined to require the representative to appear before the court
-RTC: San Juan's motion DENIED: no need for appointment of administrator or executor, enough that a representative be appointed (R3.16)
-San Juan filed MR, citing LAWAS V. CA: R3.16: priority still given to the legal representative of deceased (executor/administrator of estate)
-in case the heirs of the deceased will be substituted, there must be a prior determination by the probate court of who the rightful heirs are, in line with A1058 NCC and R78.6 and R79.2. (so insist that there should be petition for appointment of an administrator of Oscar Casa's estate)
-MR DENIED
-2nd MR, append TORRES V. CA: purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of every party to due process, to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate…
…ONLY in the absence of an executor or administrator that the heirs may be allowed to substitute for the deceased party
…2nd MR DENIED: (1) same arguments; (2) MONTANONO V. SUESA & RIERA V. PALMANORI: no need for the appointment of an administrator since a legatee is not considered either an indispensable or necessary party
-MR AGAIN of San Juan:
(1) cases cited did not rule on issue of WON a substitution of a legatee under the will who died during probate may be done by simply submitting an "appointment of administrator"…cases involved WON the probate court can rule on the validity of the provisions of the will
>Opposition: 3rd MR prohibited by R37.3
>DENIED 3rd MR
CA: dismissed
(1) filed beyond the 60-day period counted from notice of denial of first MR
(2) Subsequent MRs pro forma because it sought the same relief - so did not toll the running of the 60-day period.
-MR (only interlocutory, not final judgment so should not run 60-d period from denial of 1st MR) - DENIED
  
WON 60-day period for filing of petition for certiorari is reckoned from notice of denial of 1st MR even though a 2nd and 3rd MR of same interlocutory order had been filed and later denied
YES, but different rule:
-the proscription against a pro forma motion applies only to a final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one.
-2nd MR, though based on same grounds, is not pro forma BUT may still be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of the grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court
-cannot reject 2nd MR on the ground that 2nd MR of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law
Thus, there are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order:
(1) the date when notice of the judgment, resolution or order was received;
(2) when a motion for a new trial or reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted; and
(3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by petitioner.
 
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness, considering that a petition is required to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be nullified
 
BUT Agree with CA that Petition for certiorari should have been filed 60 days after notice of denial of 1st MR, otherwise indefinite delays will enuse
 
WON a person nominated as "administrator" by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee despite the fact that such "administrator" is not court-appointed
YES. The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate.42 Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court.
 
The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased. The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true. In Gochan v. Young,a case of fairly recent vintage, the Court ruled as follows:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Vda. De Reyes v. CA, 169 SCRA 524 (1989)
Short Facts: Beatriz, (not sure if illegit or legit child) opposes the correction of judgment and the re-opening of the probate proceedings to correct a alleged typographical error in the sqm of the Antipolo land in question, claiming that there was no typographical error and the parties intended to share only that area of land.
Decedent: Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.
Pilar Ibanez de Susuarregui: surviving spouse of decedent
-administratix of the estate
Illegit children:
Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.
Enrique de Zuzuarregui
Jose de Zuzuarregui
*Beatriz de Zuzuarregui vda. Re reyes: daughter of Antonio Sr. by another mother
Pacita Javier: niece of administratix
-mother of the three illegit children
 
Project of partition:
Pilar: 12/16, inclusive of 1/2 of the assets (share of conjugal partnership)
Beatriz: 1/16
Antonio, Jr.: 1/16
Enrique: 1/16
Jose: 1/16
 
Antipolo, Rizal property: mentioned 4x in document
-adjudicated to Pilar (12/15), Antonio Jr. (1/15), Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15)
-Pacita relinquished her right "in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property"
 
-administratix and other three distributees filed a MOTION TO REOPEN SPECIAL PROCEEDIGNS for the purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of the parcel of land (correct land area: 803,781.51, not 83,781sqm)
-opposition to motion
TC:
(1) opened for purpose of correcting clerical error in description of land
(2) correct land area to conform with description of land area in TCT
(3) correction be made in the project of partition
-CA: Affirm
 
Pacita's allegation: no clerical area. The area in the project of partition is correct. She would not have relinquished her share in the Antipolo land if she new nothing would remain from the land. It was even repeated 4x in the project of partition
 
WON there was a clerical error, which is an exemption to correcting or supplying a final judgment already entered?
 
NONE.
On correction of clerical errors:
It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered. The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become final. The court may make this amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in the body of the decision.
 
-TC already found that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by inadvertence in the project of partition
 
-probate proceeding, nature:
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the ENTIRE estate of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares.
-It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and complete adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate, necessarily including the entire area of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus as perceptively posed by the queries of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was to make only a partial adjudication and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did not make any further disposition of the remaining balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound reason would the heirs have in holding in suspense the distribution of the difference of 720,000 square meters?
-if they cannot see eye to eye, why share properties as co-owners?
-weird that the parties came up with 83,781, just omitting the zeroes. So only logical reason is that they just forgot to put zero.
-according to her own computation, she already received her 1/16 share in the estate. There would not be a substantial difference in value in their shares...
 
Reynoso v. Santiago, 85 Phil 268
Short summary: husband and eldest son wanted to reopen the probate proceedings of the deceased wife/mom and wanted the reappointment of the surviving husband as the executor
Facts:
Decedent: Salvadora Obispo
S.Spouse: Victorio Reynoso
Eldest son: Juan Reynoso
-Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of decedent Salvadora Obispo presented an application in CFI for administration of Salvadora's property (No. 2914)
-Father and son opposed application and filed a document, allegedly the last will and testament of Salvadora, w/ a counter petition for probate
TC: alleged last will and testament is a forgery
CA: reversed
 
-Father and son filed 2 petitions, one special proceedign (No. 2914) an another under a separate and new docket number (3107) and with different title (Testate Estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo)
1st petition: (1) special administrator, Meliton Palabrica (2914), be ordered to turn over the properties of the deceased and proceeds of copra, nuts and other agricultural products to Victorio Reynoso, and render accounting within reasonable time;
(2) render an accounting w/n a reasonable time
(3) closing of intestate proceeding
2nd petition: estate be administered and settled in special proceeding, Victorio Reynoso be appointed as executor
-prayer for accounting
-delivery by him to the new executor of the properties
 
-2 petitions decided separately by Judge Santiago
1st petition: substitution unnecessary, inconvenient and expensive + intestate proceeding should not be converted into a testate proceeding in the same original expediente w/o the necessity of changing its number, name or title
-withheld: because of the pendency on appeal of a case in which special administrator is plaintiff and appellee and Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant (re: parcel of coconut land)
 
WON the intestate proceeding should be discontinued and a new proceeding should be instituted instead?
-this is in the sound discretion of the court. In no manner does it prejudice the substantial rights of any heirs or creditors. Amor propio is perhaps the only thing is at stake on this phase of the controversy.
 
WON a regular executor should be appointed?
-appointment of the deceased's husband as executor or administrator: If one other than the surviving spouse is appointed, which is possible, the feared conflict will not materialize. If Victorio Reynoso is chosen, a special administrator may be named to represent the estate in the suit against him. Section 8 of Rule 87 provides that "If the executor or administrator has a claim against the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court shall appoint a special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor in the settlement of the claims." The situation in which Victorio Reynoso is found with reference to the land within the spirit if not exactly within the letter of this provision.
-Subject to this observation, an administrator should be appointed without delay in accordance with the final decision of the Court of Appeals. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will or some other cause. The Court of Appeals having decreed the probate of the will and the appointment of an albacea, there is no valid reason for the further retention of a special administrator. The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement and distribution of the estate. There are important duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator can not perform, and there are many actions to be taken by the court which could not be accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed.
 
B. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs – Summary settlement of estates
 
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs
If the decedent left no will
And no debts
And the heirs are all of age
Or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose
The parties may,
Without securing letters of administration
Divide the estate among themselves as they see fit
By means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds
And should they disagree
They may do so in an ordinary action of partition.
If there is only one heir
He may adjudicate to himself the entire estate
by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds
The parties to an extrajudicial settlement,
Whether by public instrument
or by stipulation in a pending action for partition
or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit
shall file,
simultaneously with
and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument
or stipulation in the action for partition
or the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds
a bond with the said register of deeds,
in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved
as certified to under oath by the parties concerned
and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule.
It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts
If no creditor files a petition for letters of administration
Within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement
Or administration
Shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
In the manner provided in the next succeeding section;
But no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
Who has not participated therein
Or had no notice thereof.
 
Section 2 – Summary settlement of estates of small value
Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person
Whether he died testate or intestate,
Does not exceed Php10,000.00
And that fact is made to appear to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate
By the petition of an interested persn
And upon hearing,
Which shall be held not less than 1 month
Nor more than 3 months
From the date of the last publication of a notice
which shall be published once a week
for 3 consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province,
and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct,
the court may proceed summarily,
without the appointment of an executor
or administrator,
and without delay,
to grant, if proper,
allowance of the will, if there be,
to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate,
and to apportion and divide it among them
after the payment of such debts of the estate
as the court shall then find to be due;
and such persons,
in their own right,
if they are of lawful age
and legal capacity,
or by their guardians or trustees
legally appointed and qualified,
if otherwise,
shall thereupon be entitled to receive
and enter into the possession of
the portions of the estate to be awarded to them respectively.
The court shall make such orders as may be just
Respecting the costs of the proceedings,
And all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof
Shall be recorded in the office of the clerk
And the order of partition or award,
If it involves real estate,
Shall be recorded in the proper register’s office.
 
Section 3 – Bond to be filed by distributees
The court,
Before allowing a partition
in accordance with the provisions of the proceeding section,
may require the distributes,
if property other than real is to be distributed,
to file a bond in an amount to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of any just claim
which may be filed under the next succeeding section.
 
Section 4 – Liability of distributees and estate
If it shall appear at any time within 2 years after the settlement and distribution of an estate
In accordance with the provisions of either of the first two sections of this rule,
That an heir
Or other person
Has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate,
Such heir or such other person
May compel the settlement of the estate In the courts
in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation.
And if within the same time of 2 years,
It shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid,
Or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in money,
The court having jurisdiction of the estate may,
by order for that purpose,
After hearing,
Settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation
And order how much and in what manner
Each distribute shall contribute in the payment thereof,
And may issue execution,
If circumstances require,
Against the bond provided in the next preceding section
Or against the real estate belonging to the deceased,
Or both.
Such bond and such real estate
Shall remain charged with a liability to
Creditors,
Heirs,
Or other persons
For the full period of 2 years after such distribution,
Notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may have been made.
 
Section 5 – Period for claim of minor or incapacitated person
If on the date of the expiration of the period of 2 years prescribed in the preceding section
The person authorized to file a claim is
a minor
or mentally incapacitated,
Or is in prison
Or outside of the Philippines,
He may present his claim within 1 year after such disability is removed.
 
Cases
Cruz vs. Cristobal, 498 SCRA 37
Short Summary: Children of 1st marriage were excluded from the partition of the San Juan Lot by their father by the Children of the 2nd Marriage
1st marriage children:
Buenaventura Cristobal and Ignacia Cristobal
>Elisa-bunso
>Mercedes - eldest sister
>Anselmo
>Socorro
(SAME)
 
2nd marriage children:
Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez
>Norberto
>Florencio
>Eufrosina
>Jose
(JENF)
 
Dad bought land in San Juan in 1926. He died in 1930. So children squabble over property.
-Children of 2nd marriage executed an EJ partition of San Juan property w/o knowledge of 1st marriage children (1st marriage children only found out about it after 6 decades)
-they attempted to settle at the barangay level but failed to do so.
-1st marriage children filed COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AND DAMAGES:
(1) Annulment of deed of partition
(2) cancellation of TCTs in favor of 2nd marriage children
(3) re-partitioning of the subject property
(4) damages
-evidence presented to prove filiation (by 1st marriage children)
*baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo and Socorro
*Certification from Local Civil Registrar for Socorro that the records in 1909 (when she was born) were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear
*Testimonies:
>Elisa: mom (Ignacia) died when she was only 1y7m
…lived with aunt Martina Cristobal because dad married again
…brother Anselmo and sister Socorro lived with 2nd family in San Juan
…when dad died, Anselmo lived with her and their aunt then Socorro lived with Mercedes
…when Stepmom Donata died, 2nd family children lived with Elisa, Anselmo and their aunt
…she is now living in the disputed San Juan property since 1948. Other houses in the area belonged to half brothers and sisters
-out of the 535sqm, she only occupies 36sqm of the San Juan lot
-2nd marriage children divided the property among themselves w/o giving 1st marriage children their share
-she was offered by Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the land or money but said she'll have to consult the other 1st marriage children. When she inquired, she found out that the 2nd marriage children already divided amongst themselves the said property to the exclusion of the 1st marriage children
CROSS: knew that the 2nd marriage children were the ones paying real estate tax due to the land
>Ester Santos: corroborated what Elisa already said
…said that the children had harmonious relationship, until when the 1st marriage children and their grandchildren were called squatters by the 2nd marriage children and their grandchildren
CROSS: did not know the name of the 1st wife though she knew Buenaventura was married prior to marriage with Donata
>Jose (presented by the 1st FC though belonging to the 2nd FC): only found out about the 1st FC when they lived with aunt Martina, and did not admit that Elisa was their sister but only offered land so that she could have a piece of property of her own
 
Evidence of 2nd FC (respondents):
*Testimonies:
>Eufrosina: parents (Donata and Buenaventura) were married in 1919. They bought the San Juan property in 1926.
…they lived with Aunt Martina since their parents died and knew since they were kids about the 1st FC (that they were their brothers and sisters)
…admitted that they did execute an EJ Partition of the San Juan property but asserted that the 1st FC never asserted their alleged right over the property
…that they were the ones paying for the real estate tax of said property
 
TC: dismissed case: petitioners failed to prove their filiation with Buenaventura Cristobal
…baptismal and birth certificates have scant evidentiary value
…inaction for a long period of time amounted to laches
 
CA: were able to prove their filiation thru "other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws" BUT they are barred by lachees
 
WON LACHES APPLY WHEN IT RESULTS TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY SUCH PRINCIPLE
NO.
-PRELIMINARY MATTER: although the title of the pleading filed by the petitioners is for annulment of title and damages, they prayed for the re-partitioning of the subject land so the court would not limit their decision on the title
 
-WON Filiation proved:
A172. Filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws: may consist of the child’s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the child’s name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child’s pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
-in this case, the petitioners were able to present many evidences which would show that they were indeed children of Buenaventura. The respondents on the other hand failed to refute the claim of the petitioners that they were Buenaventura's children (some even admitted that they were their half bro and sis)
 
-WON DEED OF PARTITION VALID: R74.1
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied)
-here: the sole property of Buenaventura's estate is the San Juan property, thus, it is equivalent to the EJ settlement of t his estate. As the 1st MC were excluded from said partition (and did not have notice thereof), the said partition would not bind them.
 
-WON Action has already prescribed
No.
*Article 494, NCC: "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned."
... "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
*Budlong vs. Bondoc: action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription
 
-how divided:
Old civil code applies (as Donata and Buenaventura both died in the 1930s when the NCC was only effective 1950).
Art 921 and 931: intestate succession = all children would divide the estate equally
Art834: widow was only entitled to usufruct over property, which would terminate upon her death
 
WON Laches would apply.
NO.
-Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit.
-There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner. 29 Laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.
 
*Nominal damages awarded
 
Cua v. Vargas, 506 SCRA 374
SHort Summary: Cua bought property from some of the co-heirs who were also signatories to the 2 documents they executed, excluding some of the other heirs who were not notified before the alleged partition, though there was a publication of the partition after the partition was done.
Mom/Decedent: Paulina Vargas
Heirs:
Ester
Visitacion
Juan
Zenaida
Rosario
<> 
Andres
Gloria
Antonina
Florentino
 
Those who signed the notarized EJ Settlement:
Ester
Visitacion
Juan
Zenaida
Rosario
-the said EJ Settlement was published in Catanduanes Tribune for 3 consecutive weeks
-they were also the ones who executed an EJ Settlement Among Heirs with Sale with Cua
*the latter 4 never signed any document
*all documents executed and published in 1994
 
-one of the heirs (Gloria Vargas, widow of Santiago Vargas) claimed that she only knew of the EJ Settlement + Sale when the original house was demolished sometime in 1995; claimed she was unaware of said settlement
-tried to redeem the property from Cua but Cua refused their offer
-amicable settlement not reached in barangay level
-ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF EJ SETTLEMENT AND LEGAL REDEMPTION OF LOT, MTC: 30-d period ff a written notice by vendors to co-owners not sent to them so the EJ Settlement and Sale were null and void and had no legal effect on them
MTC: DISMISS
-transaction occurred after partition so the co-owners could validly dispose of their shares
-written notice of sale under A1088, though not sent, was cured by the ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF SALE (which was more than 30d before filing of complaint)
-no bad faith on part of Cua
 
RTC, appeal: affirm MTC
CA: Reversed RTC and MTC
-pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent to the same.
-MR Denied
 
WON PUBLICATION of the EJ Partition was binding on the non-signatory heirs because it constitutes due notice and therefore, the non-signatory co-heirs were already estopped from assailing the partition and sale

NO. Publication was made AFTER THE PARTITION WAS MADE, NOT BEFORE WHICH WAS REQUIRED IN R74.1
-The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
-The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.
 
WON THE RESPONDENTS NON-SIGNATORY CO-HEIRS HAD RIGHT TO REDEEM?
YES.
-sale of pro indiviso shares allowed, subject to right of redemption of other co-heirs. This right was never lost because the non-signatory co-heirs were never notified in writing of the actual sale. NOTIFICATION IN WRITING OF THE SALE BY THE VENDOR is required to start the period of redemption (w/n 1 month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale); even if the co-heirs have actual knowledge of sale, the notification in writing is still required. As there was no such notice here, the right to redeem the shares is still with the non-signatory co-heirs.
-method of notification remains exclusive, no alternative provided by law
-purpose of A1088: keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership
 
WON Cua was a builder in GF
-not in GF because he was very much aware that NOT ALL THE HEIRS PARTICIPATED IN THE EJ SETTLEMENT + SALE, as evident from the face of the document itself
-since no valid partition yet, no sale could occur. Despite this glaring fact, and over the protests of the respondents, he still constructed improvements on the property
 
WON MTC does not have jurisdiction, this being incapable of pecuniary estimation
Cua estopped thru active participation in the MTC
 
WON it should still be dismissed for non-joinder of indispensable parties
NO.
-indispensable party: party-in-interest, without whom there can be no final determination of an action and who is required to be joined as either plaintiff or defendant.
-here: prayer of complaint was that they be allowed to redeem shares in property sold. The other co-heirs already relinquished their right over their shares to Cua with the alleged sale. As a result, the other co-heirs who sold him the property are not anymore needed.
 
On improper verification and CNFS
Rule may be relaxed. And since the respondent share a common interest with the other respondent, her sole signature complies with the rules.
 

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